Abstract
Introduction
As is widely acknowledged by practitioners and commentators alike, efforts to address transitional justice issues in postconflict settings often entail processes
Political Context
The TRC was an integral by-product of a pact, the Interim Constitution, which paved the way for South Africa's transition to democracy in April 1994. The issue of how apartheid-era violations would be addressed emerged as a major point of dispute in negotiations, with the incumbent government favoring amnesty and the opposition desiring prosecutions. Against that backdrop, the agreement to establish a truth commission, which was created under the terms of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (34/1995) , can be considered a compromise.
7 South Africa was not the first country to undertake such a formal inquiry in the course of a political transition, but the TRC distinguished itself with a number of innovations and has become the most famous, studied, acclaimed and widely imitated commission of its kind.
Launched in 1995, the TRC is lauded for being more public and 'victim-centered' than its predecessors. It offered multiple opportunities for direct participation, recognizing the importance of victims to the construction of a unifying national narrative and seeking to mitigate concerns about a lack of accountability for perpetrators, all of which factored into aspirations of stabilization, reconciliation and deepening the new democratic dispensation. More than 21,000 individuals submitted statements describing the abuses they or their family members experienced. Most were deemed by the TRC to have suffered one or more gross violations between 1960 and April 1994, which made them eligible for reparations. 8 In addition, over 2,000 people testified at public hearings that were organized around the country.
The TRC also implemented a conditional amnesty, which was controversial and remains unparalleled. The amnesty was the focus of a legal challenge initiated by the families of several notable political activists who died at the hands of the apartheid regime. In its 1995 judgment on the matter, the South African Constitutional Court expressed concerns about the amnesty violating the rights of victims to pursue civil action, but ultimately concluded that provisions for reparations constituted adequate redress. 9 In practice, those seeking immunity from both criminal and civil liability were required to submit a formal application concerning specific acts of violence, which were evaluated based on criteria that included full disclosure and demonstration of a political motive. Over 7,100 individuals sought amnesty, 7 To be clear, the negotiations leading to the Interim Constitution produced an agreement, included in the Postamble, that there would be an amnesty, indicating some parameters without detailing its exact form or mechanism of implementation. The TRC and the approach of tying amnesty to truth seeking were under discussion around this time, but the policy was only made official and spelled out in the 1995 legislation. See, Alex Boraine, A Country Unmasked: Inside South Africa 's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) . 8 Under Section 1 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, gross violations were defined to encompass instances of political violence, including killings, abductions, torture and severe ill treatment, as well as conspiracy to commit any of these acts. These criteria excluded other abuses such as land removals, forced displacement, arrests for pass law violations and discrimination in employment and educational settings. 9 Azanian People's Organisation and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, Case No. 671, South African Constitutional Court (1996) . but more than 5,100 of these applications were rejected because they pertained to ordinary criminal offenses or were otherwise outside the purview of the TRC. Of the 1,674 applications ultimately addressed in public hearings, 1,312 resulted in full or partial amnesty.
10
A significant share of the TRC's activities, excluding those of the Amnesty Committee, were completed by 1998, when the Commission released its so-called final report, which consisted of five volumes.
11 Review of amnesty applications continued through 2002, when the TRC disbanded after concluding its remaining work. Two codicil volumes to the report were eventually released in March 2003. 12 At this point, the TRC was essentially considered closed. Evaluations of the process were prevalent through about 2005, but dwindled thereafter, with relatively modest attention devoted to anything that has happened since the Commission disbanded.
13 Yet several things transpired that are closely related to and effectively extend the process, albeit along different and problematic trajectories.
First, in 2003, the South African government paid out monetary reparations, in the form of one-off payments of 30,000 rand (approximately $4,000) per person, to individuals accorded victim status by the TRC. This step can be viewed as meaningful progress, building on the TRC (and complying with the Constitutional Court's 1995 ruling), insofar as the compensation acknowledged the harms victims suffered and the hardships they continue to experience as a result. Yet, the government had resisted the payments, with then President Thabo Mbeki, among others, arguing -some would say disingenuously, given the enrichment of political elites since the transition -that the liberation movement was not fought for money and that reparations are tantamount to putting a price on losses that are fundamentally irreparable.
14 Frustrated with the slow pace of the reparations process, the Khulumani Support Group (KSG), an association of more than 30,000 victims of apartheid-era violations, sued the government in July 2002 in an effort to compel 448 D. Backer payments. 15 The grants eventually disbursed by the government were far smaller than the TRC's recommendation of six annual payments of 17,000 to 23,000 rand per person. 16 In addition, individuals who were ineligible for reparations, because they did not submit statements to the TRC or could not demonstrate that they experienced gross abuses, expressed disenchantment about being excluded from receiving the financial benefit. 17 Second, in December 2005, the policies of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), the principal unit in the government responsible for pursuing criminal cases against individuals who were denied or did not apply for amnesty, were amended to allow the National Director of Public Prosecutions significant discretion in deciding whether to pursue indictments for past atrocities. 18 The amendment invoked the criteria of the TRC's amnesty process, as well as other considerations (for example, the personal circumstances of the accused, the degree of his or her cooperation with the TRC and the NPA's investigations, whether prosecution might contribute to or undermine reconciliation and nationbuilding and whether the prosecution might further traumatize victims). The TRC forwarded 800 prospective cases to the NPA, 19 but few trials have been undertaken, and the policy amendment evidently contributed to the lack of activity on this front. In response, KSG, the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and five noted victims partnered to challenge the amendment in court. Their filing argued that the policy modifications amounted to a second amnesty, permitting reconsideration and revision of previous decisions by the TRC about whether individual applicants ought to be subject to prosecution. As a result, they suggested, the changes undermined a pillar of the TRC process. In December 2008, the North Gauteng High Court struck down the amendment as unconstitutional, which has prompted signs of movement in the NPA toward contemplating prosecutions but as yet no indictments. 20 Third, in November 2007, Mbeki initiated a special process to consider applications for pardons, with recommendations made by a reference group of representatives of the parties in parliament. 21 The upshot is that access to immunity was Thus, the government did several things between 2003 and 2007 that might have influenced impressions of the amnesty: grudgingly conceding to pay reparations, which fell short of expectations emanating out of the TRC process and arguably obligations affirmed by the Constitutional Court; failing to follow through on and actively countermanding the inherent promise that those who failed to apply for or were denied amnesty would be subject to prosecution; and further attempting to expand the reach of protection from accountability via pardons. 23 A natural question is whether these circumstances prompted any reaction in the public, especially among victims, who have cause to feel that the compromise the TRC embodied -amnesty in exchange for peace, truth, reconciliation and redress -was undermined by the apparent lack of will, direct opposition and scheming among political elites.
Research Design
The panel survey data affords a valuable perspective on the stability of victim preferences concerning transitional justice. Of particular interest, the data provides insight on the question of whether attitudes about amnesty, accountability and reparations have evolved in ways that can be associated with key events subsequent to the completion of the TRC process.
The first wave of the survey was conducted between November 2002 and January 2003. Eligibility followed the TRC's basic criteria for determining victim status. An initial sampling frame was developed using the extensive membership database of the Western Cape branch of KSG. I opted to stratify the database records by community and the extent of direct participation in the TRC process (testified, gave statement only or did neither), then developed randomly ordered lists of contacts for communities in the Cape Town area. To avoid confining the sample to KSG members, whose experiences and attitudes may differ from those of the rest of the victim population, other individuals who met the eligibility criteria were recruited 450 D. Backer within the surrounding neighborhoods. Specifically, the household of each KSG respondent served as a physical starting point to locate and recruit an additional respondent who was not a member of the organization to participate in the survey. Generic rules were employed to direct the search in the interest of randomization. In addition, some respondents who testified before the TRC were located through referrals. Overall, the first-wave sample consisted of 220 respondents.
For the second wave, conducted in June and July 2008, fieldworkers were instructed to aim to interview as many of the same individuals as possible. The yield was 153 respondents (69.5%), which is good for a panel survey, especially given the passage of time and difficult health and living conditions. Among the reasons for attrition were people who passed away, moved or could not be found at their previous address, plus a small number of refusals. The profiles of the two samples are similar, with the differences not substantial enough to be likely to bias the findings from the analysis. Table 1 presents an overview of the respondents who participated in both waves of the survey, including their demographic characteristics, past experiences of violence and key aspects of their interactions with the TRC process.
The survey questionnaires, which included Xhosa translations below the original English throughout the document, were administered in person by teams of multilingual fieldworkers.
24 Stata 10 was used to carry out imputations of missing responses, in order to maximize the available data, as well as to perform the analysis.
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Results
A conventional wisdom is that victims of past violations tend to prefer some form of punitive justice and are therefore inclined to reject amnesty. The logic is that victims can be expected to see it as appropriate that those complicit in violations face consequences commensurate with the harms they caused and to feel that doing otherwise would maintain and perhaps even magnify an inequity associated with these violations. These sentiments are reflected in the various legal challenges and related anecdotal evidence discussed above.
Yet, the results from the first wave of the survey run contrary to intuition, as 57.5 percent of the respondents expressed approval of amnesty (with the sample restricted to those who participated in both waves to provide a suitable baseline for comparison). 26 The unexpectedly high level of support around the time the TRC completed its work suggests that the conditional amnesty fared better than 24 The Institutional Review Board at the University of Michigan approved the study protocol, as part of which each respondent gave oral informed consent to participate. 25 Five sets of imputations were conducted via the sequential chained equations approach, using the add-on procedure ice written by Patrick Royston. could be anticipated in an audience seemingly disposed to have a critical outlook. Admittedly, the sample is small and confined to a single locale, which constrains one's ability to make broader generalizations. In addition, without data from the outset of the TRC process, one cannot be certain whether impressions of amnesty improved, diminished or remained stable as a result of observing its implementation. Nonetheless, the initial reading from the first-wave survey in Cape Town is relatively favorable. Of note, analogous victim surveys I directed subsequently in Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone produced strikingly similar results. All of this comparative evidence is also reasonably congruent with the findings of general population surveys conducted by other scholars in South Africa and northern Uganda -contexts characterized by high rates of exposure to violations.
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A possible explanation for what may initially appear to be a curious outcome is that people who have experienced severe conflict may think in practical terms and are prepared to endorse measures they believe will help to reduce the chances of continued violence.
28 Consistent with this argument, 91 percent of respondents in the first wave of the survey agreed that amnesty was essential to avoid a civil war in South Africa.
29 Such a perspective does not inevitably translate into support for amnesty, but the two attitudes are correlated. Also, circa 2002-2003, a substantial number of victims may have expected, or at least remained optimistic, that with the TRC process closed, the government would soon turn to prosecuting alleged perpetrators who were denied or had not applied for amnesty. Consequently, these individuals may still have been prepared to give the benefit of the doubt to the policy, inasmuch as it had served a useful purpose and continued to offer the prospect of some criminal accountability.
At the same time, a willingness to accept the instrumental rationale for amnesty does not imply satisfaction with the policy. In fact, only 18.3 percent of respondents agreed that granting amnesty to perpetrators is fair to victims. 30 Furthermore, a majority of the respondents backed repercussions for perpetrators, such as lustration and compensation to victims. 31 Thus, the conventional wisdom posited above is not entirely inaccurate. Many victims exhibit complex attitudes, simultaneously expressing both moral and 27 See, Gibson, supra n 4, on South Africa, and Pham et al. supra n 3, on northern Uganda. 28 By way of contrast, a survey of Darfurian refugees in eastern Chad found that very few respondents supported amnesty, whereas almost all respondents wanted prosecutions undertaken by the International Criminal Court (ICC), which was matched by a lack of concern that the latter would endanger peace, although the results showed greater apprehension that the ICC' The results from the second wave of the Cape Town survey corroborate this hypothesis. Most significant, approval of amnesty declined dramatically from before, to just 20.4 percent. The share of respondents who believed in 2008 that the amnesty had been essential to avoid a civil war fell by 20 percentage points relative to 2002-2003, although 70.5 percent still expressed this sentiment. Meanwhile, the proportion of respondents who believed the amnesty is fair to victims was sliced to just 8.5 percent. Also, respondents increasingly favored imposing consequences on perpetrators. In particular, they believed overwhelmingly that those who were not granted (93%) or did not seek (94%) amnesty should be subject to criminal prosecution. 32 Substantial agreement was observed about prosecuting more people with various political and institutional affiliations, including individuals from past National Party governments (95%), the South African Defence Force (95%), the South African Police (95%), the Inkatha Freedom Party (87%) and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the Pan-Africanist Congress (70%) and the African National Congress (68%). Furthermore, most viewed devoting greater effort in this direction as vital to the integrity of both the TRC process (76%) and the conditional amnesty (70%), as well as to fortifying democracy in South Africa (82%).
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Together, the results imply that the respondents' earlier acceptance of amnesty was a reluctant, contingent concession that coexisted with a basic interest in seeing at least a degree of accountability, especially in the event the bargain underlying the TRC process fell flat. On top of this, 54 percent of the respondents indicated in the second wave of the survey that they favor such criminal accountability even at the risk of disruption to political stability. 34 Thus, renewed conflict is not simply perceived as less of a risk than before; rather, a majority is prepared to discount instrumental concerns about conflict in favor of pursuing other principled objectives.
A final step in the analysis is to explore whether the decline in support for amnesty can be attributed to the aforementioned policy developments during the intervening period, or if it has other sources. For this purpose, I estimated a series of multivariate regression models. The dependent variable is always the change in 454 D. Backer attitudes toward amnesty between the two waves of the survey (on a scale from +3, representing substantially higher approval, to −3, representing substantially lower approval). I constructed specifications to test individually and in tandem several sets of independent variables of interest related to prosecutions (awareness of ongoing discussions, beliefs about importance); pardons (awareness of review process, support for review process); reparations (adequacy of what a respondent received, fairness of payments to victims, efficiency of process); the role and performance of the TRC (essential to avoid civil war, informed respondent about family member(s), provided an accurate and unbiased account, met expectations); and the fairness of amnesty to victims. I also tested gender; age; education; financial problems experienced within the previous five years; direct involvement in the TRC process (gave statement, testified, perpetrator applied for amnesty); and KSG membership as controls. Table 2 reports the results of the estimations. As would be expected, changing perceptions of the fairness of amnesty (this variable is also on a scale from +3, representing a substantially increased sense of fairness, to −3, representing substantially decreased fairness) exert a statistically significant positive effect on approval of the amnesty (Models 1, 7 and 8). 35 The evolving attitudes toward amnesty appear to bear no relationship, however, to considerations about prosecutions (Model 2). Initial evidence suggests that awareness of the pardons review process (Model 3) and perceptions of the efficiency of the reparations scheme (Model 4) may also have an impact on amnesty attitudes, but these findings are not robust to differences in the model specification. Instead, changes over time in evaluations of the TRC's performance in informing people about what happened to their family members (again on a scale from +3, representing substantial improvement, to −3, representing substantial worsening) is the only other variable to exhibit a consistent association with changes in attitudes toward amnesty (Models 5-8). Other perceptions of aspects of the TRC's role and performance lack such an impact (Model 5). Meanwhile, none of the control variables is found to be statistically significant in any of the specifications, and their inclusion does not materially affect the substantive conclusions.
According to the panel survey data, therefore, two factors that clearly contribute to evolving attitudes toward amnesty are changes in impressions of fairness concerning the amnesty policy and assessments of the extent of individualized truth recovery. No conclusive evidence exists that circumstances surrounding reparations, prosecutions and pardons play a meaningful role, although these nonresults, which are contrary to expectations, could be due to the nature of the available data, particularly the small sample as well as the wording of the relevant questions. It also bears noting that the best of the model specifications explains only about 20 percent of the variance in amnesty attitudes. Other factors that were either unobserved or not included in the estimations may account for the rest, which warrants further analysis. 
Conclusion
This article provides a glimpse at results from a rare empirical study that takes seriously the understanding that transitional justice processes unfold over an extended period of time, during which individual attitudes may vary in ways related to formal measures that are implemented as well as the broader political context. The small panel survey of victims in the Cape Town area reveals a pronounced decline 456 D. Backer in approval of South Africa's amnesty, acceptance of its necessity to avoid civil war and beliefs concerning its fairness, as well as increased demand for various forms of accountability, over the five years following the conclusion of the TRC process. During this interval, action and inaction by the government undermined the bargain inherent in the unique conditional amnesty policy that was central to the TRC's existence. While this measure can be viewed with skepticism and in practice faced legal and other challenges, it enjoyed surprisingly strong support among the survey respondents even at the conclusion of the TRC process, circa [2002] [2003] . The data indicates, however, that the approval was reluctant and never signified unqualified satisfaction. It also shows the intensification of discontent over time.
The multivariate analysis fails to demonstrate a clear link between the sharply declining approval of amnesty among the survey respondents and the government's policies in regard to reparations, prosecutions and pardons. Yet, the fact that the latter have reneged on ostensible commitments made to victims may contribute to an increasingly pervasive sense that the amnesty is unfair, which is found to have a distinct negative impact on approval of this policy. The one other factor found to exert an influence is updated evaluations of how well the TRC did in informing people about what happened to their family members. Support for amnesty lags among those who have grown disenchanted about the extent of truth this process has yielded, perhaps because they have been awaiting further revelations and follow-up that were part of the bargain -actual and perceived -but have not yet come to pass.
The findings validate the argument that transitional justice ought to be treated and studied rigorously as a dynamic process. Of particular importance, the immediate consequences of any measure do not necessarily represent a durable status quo. Instead, these outcomes are contingent, subject to ongoing scrutiny and reassessment by interested stakeholders and therefore vulnerable in the event of altered conditions, including the introduction of new policies and the lack of follow-through on existing policies.
Panel survey methodology, in turn, can be usefully employed to document changes in individual attitudes. Here, it provides compelling evidence to suggest that the political bargains concerning amnesty in South Africa quickly lost their appeal among those who experienced serious harms during the apartheid era -a crucial constituency.
Additional research along these lines, on a bigger scale and in different settings, is needed to quantify more fully and precisely the impact of transitional justice processes and component measures, as well as to increase appreciation of how individuals' responses and other relevant effects can fluctuate over time in meaningful ways. 36 The lessons from such studies are therefore essential to improving policy design, implementation and evaluation in this area.
